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 THE RISE AND FALL OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF 
MARITIME TERRORISM: THE GHOST OF PIRACY IS STILL 
HUNTING! 
MD SAIFUL KARIM∗ 
Maritime terrorism is a serious threat to global security. A major debate in this regard 
is the treating of acts of maritime terrorism as piracy by some scholars and a rejection 
of this view by another camp. Moreover, the international law of maritime terrorism 
suffers from fundamental definitional issues, much like the international law of 
terrorism. This article examines the current international law of maritime terrorism 
with a particular emphasis on the debate regarding the applicability of the 
international law of piracy in the case of maritime terrorism. It argues that the 
international law of piracy is not applicable in the enforcement and prosecution of 
maritime terrorists on the high seas. International treaties on terrorism and the post-
September 11 developments relating to international laws on terrorism have created a 
workable international legal framework for combating maritime terrorism, despite 
some bottlenecks.  
1. Introduction 
FREEDOM is a relative term. It involves limitations as well as rights. There is no 
such thing as absolute freedom of any kind. … The matter is one of adjustment. As 
to the seas, the question is not one of “whether,” but of “how much.”1 
Maritime terrorism is a serious concern for international and national security.2 
Maritime terrorism may include attacks on vessels or critical infrastructure 
including ports, maritime navigation systems, oil and gas facilities on the sea, 
submerged pipelines and communications cables. It may also involve attacks 
on commercial interests, including tourism and fishing industries, as well as 
terrorist actions against any target, including those on land-based facilities 
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1  Arthur Garfield Hays “What is Meant by the Freedom of the Seas” (1918) 12 AJIL 283 at 
283. 
2  The United Nations Secretary-General identified seven major threats to maritime security, 
including maritime terrorism. See Oceans and the Law of the Sea: Report of the Secretary-
General UN Doc A/63/63 (10 March 2008) at [63]–[71]. See Michael D Greenberg and others 
Maritime Terrorism: Risk and Liability (RAND Corporation, Pittsburgh, 2006); Michael 
Richardson A Time Bomb for Global Trade: Maritime-related Terrorism in an Age of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2004); Peter 
Chalk The Maritime Dimension of International Security: Terrorism, Piracy, and Challenges 
for the United States (RAND Corporation, Pittsburgh, 2008); James Jay Carafano “Small 
Boats, Big Worries: Thwarting Terrorist Attacks From the Sea” (11 June 2007) Heritage 
Foundation <www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/12833>; Gal Luft and Anne Korin 
“Terrorism Goes to Sea” (2004) 83(6) Foreign Aff 61. 
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using maritime approach.3 Ten out of the 44 major terrorist groups of the 
world, as identified in the United States Department of State’s Country 
Reports on Terrorism, have maritime terrorism capabilities.4 A number of 
recent high-profile maritime terrorism incidents show that the threat of 
maritime terrorism is an ongoing phenomenon.5  
Unlike many other international crimes, there is no agreed legal definition 
of maritime terrorism. One reoccurring debate in this regard is the treating of 
maritime terrorism as piracy by some authors and a rejection of this view by 
another camp. Moreover, the international law of maritime terrorism suffers 
from fundamental definitional issues, much like the international law of 
terrorism. The fundamental question remains: do we really need to treat 
maritime terrorism as piracy in order to establish an effective international 
legal framework? This question is linked with another question: is the separate 
legal regime that has evolved for maritime terrorism in the last four decades 
effective? The ineffectiveness of the international law of maritime terrorism 
does not necessarily make the international law of piracy applicable to acts of 
maritime terrorism.  
The debate regarding the applicability of the international law of piracy to 
maritime terrorism apparently became obsolete after the adoption of the 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of 
Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention)6 as a response to the high-profile 
Achille Lauro incident.7 It seems that the debate is reoccurring, as some recent 
                                                          
3  Border Protection Command “Maritime Terrorism” (30 October 2013) Border Protection 
Command <www.bpc.gov.au/webdata/resources/files/MaritimeTerrorismWEB_000.pdf>. 
4  Donna J Nincic “Maritime Terrorism: How Real is the Threat?” Fair Observer (online ed, 16 
July 2012). 
5  In 2000, a group of suicide bombers attacked a United States Navy ship – the USS Cole – in 
Yemen, which left 17 sailors dead. After the attack on the USS Cole, maritime terrorism took 
on a new form, which has been marked by explosions, bomb attacks and suicide attacks on 
vessels using small boats, as well as similar attacks on port and offshore facilities. Some of 
these incidents include a tanker bombing off the coast of Sri Lanka (2001), Limburg (2002, 
Yemen), Superferry (2004, the Philippines), Ashod (2004, Israel), Al Basra Oil loading 
terminal (2004, Iraq) and Karachi (2004, Pakistan). In 2005, it was reported that Al Qaeda 
fired timer-controlled Katyusha rockets at two United States naval vessels – the USS Ashland 
and the USS Kearsage. In 2006, Hezbollah attacked the Israeli Saar-5 class corvette Ahi 
Hanit. In 2008, terrorists used maritime routes to go ashore in Mumbai, India, and engage in 
indiscriminate attacks. A Japanese super-tanker, M Star, was attacked by the Abdallah Azzam 
Brigades, an affiliate of Al Qaeda, in the Strait of Hormuz in August 2010. Dennis L Bryant 
“Historical and Legal Aspects of Maritime Security” (2004–05) 17 USF Mar LJ 1 at 3–4; 
Adolf KY Ng and Nong Hong “The International Legal Instruments in Addressing Piracy and 
Maritime Terrorism: A Critical Review” (2010) 27 Research in Transportation Economics 51 
at 55; Justin McCurry “Japanese oil tanker hit by terrorist bomb, say inspectors” The Guardian 
(online ed, Tokyo, 6 August 2010). 
6  Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation 
1678 UNTS 221 (opened for signature 10 March 1988, entered into force 1 March 1992) 
[SUA Convention 1988]. 
7  The Achille Lauro incident attracted significant attention from the global community. This 
incident concerned terrorists belonging to the Abu Abbas faction of the Palestine Liberation 
Front (PLF), who hijacked the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro to demand the release of some 
Palestinian prisoners from Israel. When the Israeli government rejected their demand, the 
hijackers killed an American passenger named Leon Klinghoffer. The terrorists then secured 
an arrangement with Egypt, discharging the ship in return for a safe passage to Tunis. When 
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post-SUA Convention writings tend to consider that the international law of 
piracy will be applicable to maritime terrorism.8 Against this backdrop, this 
article examines the current international law of maritime terrorism, with a 
particular emphasis on the debate regarding the applicability of the 
international law of piracy in the case of maritime terrorism. This article 
argues that the international law of piracy is not applicable to the enforcement 
and prosecution of maritime terrorists on the high seas. Nevertheless, 
international treaties on maritime terrorism and the post-September 11 
developments relating to international laws on terrorism have created a 
workable international legal framework for combating maritime terrorism.  
Part 2 of this article discusses the complexity in framing an acceptable 
legal definition of maritime terrorism. The definitional issue will be 
highlighted, before turning to the historical development of the international 
law of maritime terrorism, because the evolution of the international law of 
maritime terrorism is deeply linked with the debate surrounding the definition 
of terrorism. As will be discussed in Part 4, in the absence of an agreed 
definition of terrorism, the global community has taken a sectoral approach by 
adopting a number of international conventions dealing with different types of 
terrorism. Therefore, this Part will explore whether there is a customary 
international law definition of maritime terrorism. Part 3 examines whether the 
international law of piracy will be applicable in the case of maritime terrorism. 
If the law of piracy is applicable, it will give wider enforcement jurisdiction to 
the State. Moreover, if maritime terrorism incidents are treated as piracy, the 
crime will be treated as a crime of universal jurisdiction. As will be shown, 
although linked with very old developments in the law of piracy, the 
international law of maritime terrorism is essentially a twentieth-century 
phenomenon. Part 4 provides comprehensive examination of the development 
of the international law of maritime terrorism. It explains how a separate legal 
regime for maritime terrorism has developed in light of the uncertainty of 
applying the international law of piracy to cases of maritime terrorism. It also 
discusses the relevancy of the general international law of terrorism and the 
international conventions on terrorism in respect to maritime terrorism 
2. Legal definition of maritime terrorism 
None of the international legal instruments that are directly or indirectly 
relevant to maritime terrorism defines the term “maritime terrorism.” 
Christopher C Joyner defines maritime terrorism as “the systematic use or 
threat to use acts of violence against international shipping and maritime 
services by an individual or group to induce fear and intimidation in a civilian 
                                                                                                                               
United States authorities learned of the murder of an American passenger, they forced the 
aircraft carrying the terrorists to land in Italy, which led to the terrorists’ arrest and 
prosecution. Martin N Murphy Contemporary Piracy and Maritime Terrorism: The threat to 
international security (Taylor and Francis, Hoboken, 2007) at 45. 
8  Douglas Guilfoyle Shipping Interdiction and Law of the Sea (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2009) at 32–42; Michael Bahar “Attaining Optimal Deterrence at Sea: A Legal 
and Strategic Theory for Naval Anti-Piracy Operations” (2007) 40 V and J Transnat’l L 1. 
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population in order to achieve political ambitions or objectives.”9 This is not a 
generally accepted legal definition of maritime terrorism.  
Defining terrorism itself is a problematic issue within international law,10 
and maritime terrorism bears a similar problem as a result. As observed by the 
United States government in 1993: “the international community has 
repeatedly failed in its efforts to reach consensus on a generic definition of 
terrorism.”11 No international convention directly defines “terrorism.” There is 
a general view that there is no universally accepted international legal 
definition of terrorism.12 The international effort to formulate an acceptable 
definition of the term is not a recent one. The global community’s quest for a 
comprehensive definition started in the mid-1930s, prompted by the murder of 
the Yugoslavian king, King Alexander I, and the former French foreign 
minister, Louis Barthou.13 Consequently, the League of Nations adopted the 
Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism in 1937.14 The 
1937 Convention defined terrorism as: “criminal acts directed against a State 
and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular 
persons, or group of persons or general public.”15 This convention was never 
entered into force. 
The process of adopting a generic legal definition of terrorism was 
complicated from the beginning. As observed by Ben Saul, the League of 
Nations’ “attempt to generically define terrorism in an international treaty 
prefigured many of the legal, political, ideological and rhetorical disputes 
which plagued the international community’s attempts to define terrorism in 
the 50 years after the Second World War.”16 The global community’s effort to 
find a somewhat “acceptable definition has always been complicated by the 
fact that terrorism is a loaded term that is often used as [a] politically 
convenient label by which to deny legitimacy to an adversary while claiming it 
for oneself.”17  
                                                          
9  Christopher C Joyner “Suppression of Terrorism on the High Seas: The 1988 IMO 
Convention on the Safety of Maritime Navigation” (1989) 19 Isr YB Hum Rts 341 at 348. 
10  See generally, Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, Report of the Secretary-General 
UN Doc A/48/267/Add1 (21 September 1993). 
11  At [1]. 
12  Cástor Miguel Díaz-Barrado “The Definition of Terrorism and International Law” in Pablo 
Antonio Fernández-Sánchez (ed) International Legal Dimension of Terrorism (Koninklijke 
Brill, Leiden, 2009) 27 at 30. 
13  Ben Saul “The Legal Response of the League of Nations to Terrorism” (2006) 4 JICJ 78. 
14  Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism 19 League of Nations OJ 23 
(opened for signature 16 November 1937, not in force). 
15  At art 1(2). 
16  Saul, above n 13, at 78. 
17  Tal Becker Terrorism and the State: Rethinking the Rules of State Responsibility (Hart 
Publishing, Oxford, 2006) at 85. According to the United Nations High Level Panel on 
Terrorism:  
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Due to the serious disagreement between States, an approach of adopting 
sectoral conventions without using a generic definition of terrorism was 
advanced.18 As will be discussed later in this article, an international 
convention related to maritime terrorism was another outcome of this sectoral 
approach. The definition of terrorism was already a highly debated issue 
within the United Nations from 1972 until 11 September 2001. After the 
September 11 attack, the effort for a general definition of terrorism gained new 
momentum.19 In the aftermath of September 11, the United Nations Security 
Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1566, which provided:20 
… criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause 
death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a 
state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, 
intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organisation to 
do or to abstain from doing any act, which constitute offences within the scope of 
and as defined in the international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, 
are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a political, 
philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature, and calls 
upon all States to prevent such acts and, if not prevented, to ensure that such acts 
are punished by penalties consistent with their grave nature; … . 
While not a legal definition of terrorism, it is not very difficult to formulate 
definitional value from this paragraph.21 The effort within the United Nations 
for a comprehensive convention on terrorism, including a generic definition of 
the term, has yet to be fully successful.22 The next question is whether there is 
a customary international law definition of terrorism. Ben Saul stated:23  
                                                                                                                               
The search for an agreed definition usually stumbles on two issues. The first is the 
argument that any definition should include States’ use of armed forces against civilians. 
We believe that the legal and normative framework against State violations is far stronger 
than in the case of non-State actors and we do not find this objection to be compelling. 
The second objection is that peoples under foreign occupation have a right to resistance 
and a definition of terrorism should not override this right. The right to resistance is 
contested by some. But it is not the central point: the central point is that there is nothing 
in the fact of occupation that justifies the targeting and killing of civilians.  
 Neither of these objections is weighty enough to contradict the argument that the 
strong, clear normative framework of the United Nations surrounding State use of force 
must be complemented by a normative framework of equal authority surrounding non-
State use of force. Attacks that specifically target innocent civilians and non-combatants 
must be condemned clearly and unequivocally by all.  
  
 Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change – A more secure world: 
our shared responsibility UN Doc A/59/565 (2 December 2004) at [160]–[161]. See generally, 
Rosalyn Higgins “The General International Law of Terrorism” in Rosalyn Higgins and 
Maurice Flory (eds) Terrorism and International Law (Routledge, London, 1997) 13 at 14–18. 
18  Becker, above n 17, at 89–95. 
19  At 99.  
20  Resolution 1566 (2004) SC Res 1566, S/Res/1566 (8 October 2004) at [3]. 
21  Becker, above n 17, at 87. 
22  At 99–116. 
23  Ben Saul Defining Terrorism in International Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006) at 
270. 
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Arguments that terrorism is a customary international law crime are premature ... 
[i]n the Security Council, reference to specific acts or incidents of terrorism was 
common after 1985, and generalised references with legal consequences appeared 
after 2001. Yet terrorism is legally undefined in Council practice … .  
Antonio Cassese disagreed to some extent, stating that “it is not true that a 
definition of terrorism is lacking. … What indeed was lacking was agreement 
on the exception.”24 This means that some countries consider that a caveat 
should be added in the definition of terrorism, excluding the acts of national 
liberation movements or freedom fighters.25 In a recent decision of the Appeals 
Chamber of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon,26 presided over by Judge 
Antonio Cassese, it was found that:27 
… although it is held by many scholars and other legal experts that no widely 
accepted definition of terrorism has evolved in the world society because of the 
marked difference of views on some issues, closer scrutiny reveals that in fact such 
a definition has gradually emerged.  
After reviewing state practice and opinio juris, the Tribunal held that the 
definition of terrorism under the customary international law should consist 
of:28 
… the following three key elements: (i) the perpetration of a criminal act (such as 
murder, kidnapping, hostage-taking, arson, and so on), or threatening such an act; 
(ii) the intent to spread fear among the population (which would generally entail the 
creation of public danger) or directly or indirectly coerce a national or international 
authority to take some action, or to refrain from taking it; (iii) when the act involves 
a transnational element. 
We can say that the customary international law definition of maritime 
terrorism shall include doing the above-mentioned acts with the above-
mentioned intent in the maritime domain, or doing the same against inland 
facilities using a vessel as a weapon. There may be some problem in adopting 
                                                          
24  Antonio Cassese “Terrorism as an International Crime” in Andrea Bianchi (ed) Enforcing 
International Law Norms Against Terrorism (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2004) 213 at 214. 
25  As observed by Antonio Cassese, above n 24, at 214 (emphasis added):  
  In fact, it is not true that a definition of terrorism was lacking. A definition had evolved since 
1937 but developing countries in the UN (with the support of socialist States, whilst 
they existed) were loath to accept it unless what they considered a caveat (and which 
could more accurately be defined as an exception) was added: namely to exclude form 
definition of terrorism the acts or transactions of national liberation movements or, 
more generally, “freedom fighters”. The refusal of developed countries to accept this 
exception led to a stalemate, which erroneously been termed as a “lack of definition” of 
terrorism. What indeed was lacking was agreement on the exception. The general 
notion of crime of terrorism was not in question. 
26  In 2007, the United Nations Security Council established the Special Tribunal for Lebanon to 
prosecute people responsible for the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri 
and 22 others. This Court has been regarded as the first international criminal court with 
jurisdiction over the crime of terrorism. 
27  Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, 
Perpetration, Cumulative Charging STL Appeals Chamber STL-11-01/I (16 February 2011) at 
[83] (footnote omitted).  
28  At [85]. 
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such a generalised approach. For example, preparation for maritime terrorism 
may be undertaken on the land of a certain territory. The question would then 
arise as to whether this is classified as maritime terrorism or a general terrorist 
act. It may be particularly problematic when the preparation has been 
conducted on land and the main terrorist act was never undertaken in a 
maritime domain. Thus, inspired by the above-mentioned definition of 
terrorism by the Appeals Chamber of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, the 
definition of international maritime terrorism should address the following:  
(1) preparing for (both on land and at sea), or committing, or threatening a 
criminal act (such as murder, kidnapping, hostage-taking, arson and so 
on) in the maritime domain;  
or  
(2) preparing for (both on land and at sea), or committing, or threatening an 
attack on an offshore installation, ship and port facility;  
or  
(3) preparing for (both on land and at sea), or committing, or threatening an 
attack on a land-based facility using a vessel; 
(4) the intent to spread fear among the population (which would generally 
entail the creation of public danger) or directly or indirectly coerce a 
national or international authority to take some action, or to refrain 
from taking it; 
(5) when the act involves a transnational element. 
The acceptability of the above-mentioned definition of maritime terrorism 
will largely depend on the global community’s acceptance of the customary 
international law definition of the generic term “terrorism” provided by the 
Appeals Chamber of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.29 With this background 
information on the definition of maritime terrorism, the next Part will examine 
in detail the development of international law concerning maritime terrorism. 
Then, this article will show that, due to ongoing uncertainty regarding the 
definition of maritime terrorism, international legal instruments dealing with 
the issue have taken the approach of an inclusive definition by providing a list 
of unlawful acts and have avoided the issue of a narrative definition of the 
term “maritime terrorism.” This is symptomatic of the ongoing disagreement 
and political sensitivity of the issue. Ironically, this over-sensitivity towards 
the political aspect may aggravate the problem by curtailing the prospect of 
depoliticising the issue. This does not necessarily mean, however, that in the 
                                                          
29  This issue is highly debatable, see generally: Ben Saul “Legislating from a Radical Hague: 
The United Nations Special Tribunal for Lebanon Invents an International Crime of 
Transnational Terrorism” (2011) 24 LJIL 677; Kai Ambos “Judicial Creativity at the Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon: Is There a Crime of Terrorism under International Law?” (2011) 24 
LJIL 655; Joseph Powderly “Introductory Observations on the STL Appeals Chamber 
Decision: Context and Critical Remarks” (2011) 22 Crim LF 347.  
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absence of a definition of maritime terrorism international law will be fully 
handicapped in playing an instrumental role in combating maritime terrorism. 
3. Application of the international law of piracy in the case of maritime 
terrorism 
For a clear understanding of the main discussion of this article, it is important 
to settle at the outset whether the international law of piracy will be applicable 
in the case of maritime terrorism. The applicability of the law of piracy is a 
crucial issue. If it is applicable, it will affect both enforcement and adjudicative 
jurisdiction. It will also affect the determination of state responsibility with the 
interference of navigational rights, as piracy is the most prominent exception 
to the exclusive flag state jurisdiction on the high seas. Consequently, this 
issue remains a long-standing debate that has divided scholars into two major 
groups. The international law definition of piracy as stated in the United 
Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is very restricted in relation 
to the geographical and subject matter aspects. UNCLOS defines piracy as 
follows:30 
Piracy consists of any of the following acts: 
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed 
for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private 
aircraft, and directed: 
(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or 
property on board such ship or aircraft; 
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the 
jurisdiction of any State; 
(b)  any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft 
with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft; 
(c)  any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in 
subparagraph (a) or (b). 
UNCLOS defines piracy very narrowly and the UNCLOS definition of 
piracy has at least three shortcomings, including its geographic limits, the 
condition of the acts being for private ends, and the requirement of two ships. 
There is extensive debate among scholars as to whether the UNCLOS 
reference to “private ends” and “two ships” have prevented the application of 
the law of piracy to cases of maritime terrorism.31 Some scholars are of the 
                                                          
30  United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1833 UNTS 3 (opened for signature 10 
December 1982, entered into force 16 November 1994), art 101 [UNCLOS].  
31  See generally, Douglas Guilfoyle “Piracy off Somalia: UN Security Council Resolution 1816 
and IMO Regional Counter-Piracy Efforts” (2008) 57 ICLQ 690; Samuel Pyeatt Menefee 
“Piracy, Terrorism and the Insurgent Passenger: A Historical and Legal Perspective” in 
Natalino Ronzitti (ed) Maritime Terrorism and International Law (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, Dordrecht, 1990) 43; Bahar, above n 8; Gerald P McGinley “Achille Lauro Affair 
– Implications for International Law” (1984–1985) 52 Tenn L Rev 691; Maximo Q Mejia Jr 
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view that the law of piracy will be applicable in maritime terrorism incidents.32 
Neither the 1958 High Seas Convention nor UNCLOS provide a definition of 
“private ends”. According to Douglas Guilfoyle:33 
… [i]n fact, the words “for private ends” simply denote that the violence involved is 
not public and were originally included to acknowledge the historic exception for 
civil-war insurgencies who attacked only the vessels of the government they sought 
to overthrow. All acts of violence lacking State sanction are acts undertaken “for 
private ends.  
Guilfoyle’s view indicates that most modern-day maritime terrorism 
incidents can qualify as piracy. The Belgian Court of Cassation has supported 
the view that if violence on the high seas is the result of personal motivation, 
such as hatred, the desire for vengeance, or the wish to take justice into one’s 
own hands, this may be treated as an act done for private ends.34 The United 
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit also supported this view in a 
recent decision and held that “[t]he context here is provided by the rich history 
of piracy law, which defines acts taken for private ends as those not taken on 
behalf of a state.”35 Although the Court referred to two articles which support 
this assertion, the Court did not discuss why vast literature not supporting this 
assertion is not persuasive. While coming to this conclusion, the Court 
refrained from discussing “the rich history of piracy law”, including the history 
of the global community’s codification efforts for international piracy law that 
started from the League of Nations era.  
One commentator more specifically claimed that the “private ends” 
requirement will only be applicable to exclude “legitimate insurgents, 
attacking the shipping of the nation from which they are trying to achieve 
independence”.36 These scholars are of the view that incidents like the Achille 
Lauro can be regarded as piracy, whereas incidents like the Santa Maria37 
cannot be regarded as piracy.38 The Achille Lauro would still not qualify as 
                                                                                                                               
“Defining Maritime Violence and Maritime Security” in Proshanto K Mukherjee, Maximo Q 
Mejia Jr and Gotthard M Gauci (eds) Maintaining Violence and other Security Issues at 
Sea:the proceedings of the symposium on Maritime Violence and other Security Issues at Sea, 
26-30 August 2002 (WMU Publications, Malmö, 2002) 34; José Luis Jesus “Protection of 
Foreign Ships against Piracy and Terrorism at Sea: Legal Aspects” (2003)18 IJMCL 363; 
Helmut Tuerk “Combating Terrorism at Sea: The Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the 
Safety of Navigation” in Myron H Nordquist and others (eds) Legal Challenges in Maritime 
Security (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Boston, 2008) 41. 
32  For example, Guilfoyle; Menefee; Bahar, above n 8. 
33  Guilfoyle, above n 31, at 693 (footnote omitted). Also see Malvina Halberstam “Terrorism on 
the High Seas: The Achille Lauro, Piracy and the IMO Convention on Maritime Safety” 
(1988) 82 AJIL 269 at 276–284. 
34  Castle John and Nederlandse Stichting Sirius v NV Mabeco and NV Pafin (1986) 77 ILR 537 
at 539 (Belgian Ct of Cassation, 1986). 
35  Institute of Cetacean Research v Sea Shepherd Conservation Society US Court of Appeals 
Case no 12-35266 (9th Cir, 2013). 
36  Bahar, above n 8, at 34. 
37  A group of Portuguese and Spanish opposition movement members hijacked a Portuguese 
luxury cruise liner, the Santa Maria, on 23 January 1961. 
38  Bahar, above n 8, at 35; McGinley, above n 31, at 700. 
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piracy due to the two ships requirement. The USS Cole would more likely 
qualify as piracy, should this interpretation of private ends be accepted and had 
the incident happened on the high seas. 
To come to this conclusion, most of the scholars researched referred to a 
part of the Commentary of the “Research in International Law: Draft 
Convention on Piracy” (Harvard Draft) dealing with the issue of unrecognised 
revolutionaries.39 If unrecognised revolutionaries attack a civilian vessel, that 
will be unlawful under international law and may be “punished by an offended 
State as it sees fit.”40 If an attack by insurgents is inspired only for private 
plunder, this should be treated as piracy.41 The discussion in the Harvard Draft 
does not make clear whether the international law of piracy will be applicable 
to cases in which attacks are purely politically motivated. Before the Harvard 
Draft, the League of Nations Subcommittee on Piracy addressed this issue.42 
The Subcommittee remarked:43 
 … when the acts in question are committed from purely political motives, it is 
hardly possible to regard them as acts of piracy involving all the important 
consequences which follow upon the commission of that crime. Such a rule does 
not assure any absolute impunity for the political acts in question, since they remain 
subject to the ordinary rules of international law.  
The draft convention submitted by the Subcommittee dealt with the issue 
of an act committed with a purely political objective and an act committed by 
civil-war insurgents in two separate articles. Article 1, which provides a 
general definition, mentioned that “acts committed with pure political object” 
will not be treated as piracy. Article 4 of the same draft, which pertains to the 
issue of civil-war insurgency, provides that acts committed by civil-war 
insurgents cannot be treated as piracy by third parties, even if the regular 
government of the country in question treats it as such. This special mention of 
civil-war insurgents in art 4 and the general provision for political motives in 
art 1 indicates that the concept of “private ends” may not only be applicable to 
civil-war insurgents, but also to other piracy-like activities inspired by political 
motives.  
As noted earlier, Douglas Guilfoyle has advanced an argument that the 
distinction should be private and public.44 He is of the view that it should not 
be private versus political; if there is no authorisation from a public authority, 
government or insurgent, the incident may be treated as piracy.45 The “Report 
of the Sub-Committee of the League of Nations Committee of Experts for the 
                                                          
39  Joseph W Bingham (reporter) “Harvard Research in International Law: Draft Convention 
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43  At 791. 
44  Guilfoyle, above n 8, at 32–42. 
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Progressive Codification of International Law, League of Nations” (League of 
Nations Subcommittee report) clearly shows that, from the very beginning of 
the codification efforts, the division has been private versus political, not 
private versus public. The very term “political” is present there.  
In contrast, many writers are of the view that acts of maritime terrorism 
cannot be treated as piracy because these incidents are for political, religious or 
other goals, or for attracting attention to real or alleged grievances, not for any 
personal gain.46 As observed by Mejia:47 
Terrorism is “meant to influence the political behaviour of adversaries by attacking 
and threatening targets that possess symbolic rather than material significance.” Its 
motivation and purpose are clearly different from garden-variety piracy. The 
numerous cases of maritime terror … all differ from piracy and armed robbery in 
that they were designed to inspire fear and horror, not steal cash and cargo.  
A motive to “steal cash or cargo” may not be regarded as an essential 
element of piracy. The International Law Commission observed that piracy 
“may be prompted by feelings of hatred or revenge, and not merely by the 
desire for gain”.48 The International Law Commission also stated “[t]he acts 
must be committed for private ends”.49 L Oppenheim’s International Law, 
edited by Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, held that piracy may mean unauthorised acts 
of violence on the high seas with an intention of animo furandi. Oppenheim 
endorsed this as the view of a majority of commentators.50 Oppenheim 
identified some special cases that have not been covered by this definition, but 
that should be considered as piracy in practice. This includes converting a ship 
and goods thereon by members of the crew without any violence, and 
unauthorised violence by another vessel or passenger without any intention to 
plunder.51 Nevertheless, Oppenheim admitted that although some of the 
commentators correctly (in his view) opposed the usual definition, the matter 
was highly controversial.52 He finally proposed a definition of piracy as 
follows:53 
… every unauthorised act of violence against persons or goods committed on the 
open sea either by a private vessel against another vessel or by the mutinous crew 
or passengers against their own vessel.  
This proposition is de lege ferenda and not de lege lata. As discussed 
above, the relevant articles of the 1958 High Seas Convention as reproduced 
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verbatim in UNCLOS did not adopt such a wide definition as that suggested 
by Oppenheim. Nevertheless, the dominant view is that terrorism cannot be 
regarded as piracy.54 The notion of piracy, as observed by Helmut Tuerk, “had 
been circumscribed by both 1958 and 1982 Conventions in a precise and 
narrower form.”55 Even the Achille Lauro incident itself was not recognised as 
an act of piracy by most of the concerned States. After consideration of all 
relevant arguments, legal advisors of Austria, Italy, and Egypt:56 
found the argument convincing that the seizure of the Achille Lauro could not be 
considered as an act of piracy, as defined in the above-mentioned 1958 and 1982 
Conventions, because the hijackers did not act for “private ends” and there was no 
second vessel involved.  
Considering the above discussion, it can be concluded that acts of maritime 
terrorism cannot be treated as piracy in light of their having different 
intentions. 
Aside from this, consideration must be given to the two ships requirement, 
which refers to one ship being attacked by another ship. Under this 
requirement, such violence as committed by passengers or crewmembers of the 
same ship cannot be treated as piracy. Some scholars have held the view that 
the involvement of two ships is not an essential element of piracy.57 They are 
of the opinion that the two ships requirement was included in UNCLOS with 
a view “to exclude criminal acts by one passenger or crewmember against 
another, which were not tantamount to a revolt against law itself”.58 Once the 
terrorists commandeer a ship, rejecting the authority of any State, they become 
pirates.59 Judge Jesus (writing extra-judicially) considered it artificial to hold 
that the existing definition of piracy as provided by UNCLOS allows 
consideration of terrorist acts without the involvement of a second ship. He 
observed:60 
In my opinion one cannot read what is not written in the Article, for LOSC, Article 
101 clearly requires the involvement of two ships. Therefore, if the intention of 
those commentaries is to make acts involving only one ship also fall under the 
piracy definition, then the provision in LOSC, Article 101(a)(i) should be amended 
to say so. 
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June 2014 Rise and Fall of the International Law of Maritime Terrorism 13 
The piracy definition in UNCLOS, therefore, remains determinative in 
assessing whether acts of maritime terrorism are to be treated under 
international law as piracy. The above discussion shows that the application of 
the international law of piracy in the case of maritime terrorism is a highly 
contested issue. A plain reading of the relevant articles of UNCLOS reveals 
that UNCLOS provisions relating to piracy will not be applicable to maritime 
terrorism. UNCLOS does not directly deal with the maritime terrorism issue. 
Although some national judicial systems and publicists may consider maritime 
terrorism as piracy,61 it is highly debatable whether maritime terrorism 
involving political motives is included within UNCLOS’s definition of 
piracy.62 Although some scholars have found historical and teleological 
justifications for the application of UNCLOS in the case of maritime 
terrorism,63 the preference among States has been to adopt a new convention 
with clear and unequivocal provisions.64 This convention will be discussed in 
the next Part. 
4. Development of the international law of maritime terrorism 
As discussed, the international law of piracy will not generally be applicable in 
the case of maritime terrorism. Therefore, the next important issue for this 
article is to identify the relevant laws that are applicable to maritime terrorism. 
This section will discuss the new area of jurisprudence that has emerged in 
relation to maritime terrorism.65  
In 1985, the high-profile Achille Lauro incident, which is regarded as the 
most well-known case of maritime terrorism in the modern era,66 prompted a 
serious initiative from the International Maritime Organization for the 
progressive development of international law relating to maritime terrorism.67 
In the aftermath of the Achille Lauro incident, the United Nations General 
Assembly requested the International Maritime Organization “to study the 
problem of terrorism aboard or against ships with a view to making 
recommendations on appropriate measures.”68 In November 1986, Italy, 
Austria and Egypt submitted to the International Maritime Organization a draft 
for a new international convention for the suppression of maritime terrorism. 
The draft was modelled on the three existing conventions related to terrorism,69 
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including the Hague Convention on Aircraft Hijacking,70 the Montreal 
Convention on Sabotage of Airplanes71 and the International Convention 
Against the Taking of Hostages (Hostages Convention).72 The International 
Maritime Organization, at its meeting held on November 1986, unanimously 
decided to consider the issue and constituted an Ad Hoc Preparatory 
Committee to draft the convention.73 After two years of negotiations, the 
International Maritime Organization adopted the SUA Convention 198874 and 
the SUA Fixed Platforms Protocol 1988.75  
The SUA Convention did not define the term “terrorism” or the term 
“maritime terrorism”. Instead, the SUA Convention identified some relevant 
offences or unlawful acts.76 Article 3 of the SUA Convention classified the 
following as unlawful acts: 
a) seizure or exercise of control over a ship by intimidation; 
b) violence against a person on board a ship if the violence has potential to 
endanger the safety of navigation of the ship; 
c) destruction or damage of a ship or its cargo; 
d) placing a device or substance to destroy or damage a ship or its cargo; 
e) destruction, damage and interference to navigational facilities; 
f) endangering a ship by communicating false information. 
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As per the SUA Convention, injuring or killing any person in connection 
with the commission or the attempted commission of any of the above-
mentioned offences is also an offence.77 The Convention also makes 
attempting, threatening and abetting the above-mentioned acts a separate 
offence.78 The SUA Convention imposes an obligation on state parties to 
criminalise unlawful seizure, control, destruction and damage of ships within 
and beyond the territorial jurisdiction of their country, including its territorial 
waters.79 State parties are obliged to make this offence punishable under their 
national law, “tak[ing] into account the grave nature of those offences.”80 
The SUA Convention followed the approach of the earlier terrorism 
conventions in establishing jurisdiction instead of creating universal 
jurisdiction, as in the case of the piracy provisions in UNCLOS and the 1958 
High Seas Convention.81 The geographical extent of the SUA Convention is 
much wider than that of UNCLOS. The drafters of the SUA Convention 
considered two issues in framing the relevant provisions: first, making the 
geographical scope of the SUA Convention as wide as possible, and second, 
creating an international element in the offences vis-à-vis creating jurisdiction 
for the flag State of the targeted vessel.82  
The application of SUA Convention is not confined to the high seas or the 
exclusive economic zone, but is applicable if any incident happens in territorial 
or archipelagic waters.83 An attack on a vessel that is exercising its right to 
transit passage in a strait used for international navigation, like the Straits of 
Malacca, can be an offence under the SUA Convention. Further, an attack on a 
vessel scheduled to navigate to the high seas or the territorial waters of another 
country may be an offence under the SUA Convention. The SUA Convention 
will not be applicable if the ship in question is navigating entirely within the 
territorial sea of a single State.84 Unlike UNCLOS, the SUA Convention does 
not impose any condition of involvement of two vessels, so an act of violence 
by a passenger or crew of a ship may be treated as an offence under this 
convention if it is “likely to endanger the safe navigation of that ship.”85 
The SUA Convention introduced the principle of aut dedere aut judicare, 
whereby parties to the SUA Convention are obligated to either prosecute the 
offender or extradite the offender to the country where they can be tried.86 The 
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jurisdictional entitlements of States to prosecute maritime terrorists are 
diverse. Article 6 of the Convention provides for two types of jurisdiction: 
obligatory and discretionary. A state party is obliged to establish jurisdiction in 
cases of offences committed on its flagships, in its territory and by its 
nationals.87 A state party may also establish jurisdiction: if an offence is 
committed by a stateless person whose habitual residence is that State; if, 
during the commission of the offence, a national of the State is injured, 
threatened or killed; or, if the offence is committed in an attempt to compel the 
State to do, or to abstain from doing, any act.88 If an alleged offender is found 
in its territory, the state party is obliged to establish jurisdiction over the 
offender if it does not extradite the offender to another country, which 
establishes jurisdiction under the aforementioned provisions.89  
The SUA Convention came into effect on 1 March 1992.90 As of 7 April 
2014, there are 164 parties to the 1988 SUA Convention, which covers 
approximately 94.52 per cent of the gross tonnage of the world’s merchant 
fleet.91  
The international conference held in Rome in March 1988 also adopted the 
SUA Fixed Platforms Protocol 1988. There was no provision for fixed 
platform in the initial draft of the SUA Convention submitted by Italy, Austria 
and Egypt. Later, a number of States, including Spain and the United States, 
raised the issue that fixed platforms may also be a target for terrorists.92 The 
importance of this Protocol needs little elaboration. Extracting oil and other 
resources from the continental shelf is one of the most important economic 
activities in the oceans.93 The Protocol defines a “fixed platform” as “an 
artificial island, installation or structure permanently attached to the sea-bed 
for the purpose of exploration or exploitation of resources or for other 
economic purposes.”94 This Protocol is applicable only to fixed platforms 
located on the continental shelf. It is not applicable to internal and territorial 
waters, or the ocean floor beyond the jurisdiction of States,95 unless an 
“offender or the alleged offender is found in the territory of a State Party other 
than the State in whose internal waters or territorial sea the fixed platform is 
located.”96  
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Acts that constitute offences under the Protocol are very similar to those of 
the SUA Convention.97 The 1988 SUA Fixed Platforms Protocol did not 
deviate from the main structure of the 1988 SUA Convention, and most of the 
articles of this Protocol are a renvoi to the relevant articles of the Convention.98 
The Protocol came into effect on 1 March 1992.99 As of 7 April 2014, there are 
151 parties to the Protocol, covering approximately 88.52 per cent of the gross 
tonnage of the world’s merchant fleet.100 
The SUA Convention did not provide any additional power to state parties 
for interdiction and boarding of ships or for the arrest of offenders.101 Non-
recognition of enforcement jurisdiction over foreign ships in the case of 
terrorist acts on the high seas has been identified as a weakness of the 1988 
SUA Convention.102 The 1988 SUA Convention further failed to address some 
of the growing concerns related to maritime security after 11 September 2001, 
including: using a vessel as a weapon for a terrorist attack on port or offshore 
facilities; violence against persons on board, if the violence does not 
compromise the safety of navigation of the vessel; and acts causing serious 
damage to the marine environment by spreading nuclear, biological and 
radioactive substances with a criminal intention.103 
The attacks of 11 September 2001 further reminded States of the need for 
an effective international legal framework for combating maritime terrorism. 
In 2002, in response to these attacks, an international conference held under 
the auspices of the International Maritime Organization adopted the 
International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code).104 At the same 
conference, an amendment to Chapter XI of the Safety of Life at Sea 
Convention (SOLAS) was also adopted, creating a new Chapter XI-2 
dedicated to maritime security.105 The Legal Committee of the International 
Maritime Organization started re-examining the 1988 SUA Convention in 
October 2002 following a resolution of the International Maritime 
Organization Assembly.106 In 2005, after three years of negotiation, the 
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International Maritime Organization adopted two protocols to amend the 1988 
SUA Convention and 1988 SUA Protocol, respectively.107  
The 2005 SUA Protocol expanded the list of unlawful acts under the 1988 
SUA Convention. The new amendment makes using a ship as a weapon or as a 
means to carry out a terrorist attack an unlawful act.108 According to the newly 
inserted art 3bis, it will be an offence if any person does the following: 
• uses explosive, radioactive material and biological chemical and nuclear 
(BCN) weapons on or against a ship in a manner that causes or may cause 
death or serious injury; 
• discharges the above-mentioned substances from a ship; 
• discharges oil, liquefied natural gas, or other hazardous or noxious 
substances from a ship; 
• uses a ship in a manner that causes death or serious injury or damage; 
• threatens to commit the above offences.  
To be considered unlawful, these acts must be done with a motive to 
intimidate a population or to compel a government or an international 
organisation to do, or to abstain from doing, any act.109 Transporting on board 
a ship the above-mentioned substances or other equipment and material that 
may be used to cause or threat to cause death or serious injury is also an 
offence under the Protocol.110 Another major development of the 2005 SUA 
Protocol is the inclusion of offences under other United Nations terrorism 
conventions as offences under the 1988 SUA Convention.111 Unlawfully and 
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intentionally transporting a person on board a ship who has committed any of 
the above-mentioned offences is also an offence under the Protocol.112 
The 2005 SUA Protocol also introduced a system for ship boarding on the 
high seas and in the exclusive economic zone. This issue was seriously debated 
in the negotiation process of the Protocol. Some States were in favour of the 
boarding provisions, but other States proposed that the ship boarding system 
should contain safeguards and be consistent with UNCLOS.113 Ultimately, the 
Protocol introduced a system whereby a foreign ship can be boarded seaward 
of the outer limit of any State’s territorial sea with the expressed consent of the 
flag State if there is a suspicion that an offence has been committed or is about 
to be committed.114 The Protocol also listed a number of safeguards for 
preventing undue interference with the economic interest of flag States and 
ship-owners, as well as the rights of seafarers.115  
The most controversial issue in the negotiation process on ship boarding 
was a proposal for “tacit authorisation” to board, which was initiated by the 
United States.116 The United States proposed that if the flag State did not 
respond within four hours of a request by another party to board its vessel, law 
enforcement officers of the party requesting to board may then board that 
vessel.117 This issue was hotly debated in the drafting process.118 Later, as a 
compromise, two systems for “tacit authorisation” were included in the 
Protocol on an optional basis. According to this procedure, a State may make 
one of two declarations while joining the Protocol. First, a state party may 
notify the International Maritime Organization Secretary-General that it has 
granted another party authorisation to board and search its ships if there is any 
reasonable ground for suspicion that an offence under the SUA Convention has 
been, is being, or is about to be committed, and if it failed to response to a 
request to confirm the nationality of the vessel within four hours.119 Second, a 
state party may notify the International Maritime Organization Secretary-
General that other state parties are authorised to board and search its ships to 
determine whether an offence has been, is being, or is about to be 
committed.120 These declarations are optional. At present, there are only 29 
parties to this Protocol and none has made optional declarations for 
authorisation to board and search their ships under art 8bis(4) and (5) of the 
2005 SUA Protocol.121 
Prevention of terrorism on the high seas may arguably be problematic, as 
the Convention has failed to incorporate any provision comparable to art 105 
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of UNCLOS. Although art 8bis of the SUA Protocol 2005 makes some 
provision for boarding vessels and the detention of suspected terrorists, the 
provision is largely based on either an advance optional declaration or the ad 
hoc consent of the flag State. In an extraordinary circumstance, a State may 
visit and search a foreign vessel on the high seas on the ground of self-
defence.122 There is no doubt that a right of self-defence exists in the case of 
any ship subject to terrorist acts on the high seas.123 When there is a real threat 
of actual or imminent maritime terrorist attack, it will not be very difficult to 
take action under self-defence. This can be explained by a hypothetical 
example of suspected terrorism. State “A” has credible information that a 
commercial private vessel flying the flag of State “B” is preparing to attack an 
offshore installation of State “A”. A warship of State “A” visited and arrested 
the vessel on the high seas. Subsequent investigation conclusively and credibly 
established that the vessel was in fact preparing to launch a terrorist attack. 
Terrorism is not one of the grounds included in art 110 of UNCLOS that 
empowers a warship to visit a foreign ship on the high seas.124 It is very hard to 
imagine that this operation cannot be justified under international law as an act 
of self-defence. The international law of maritime terrorism in conjunction 
with the existing customary and general international law provides a workable 
legal framework for combating maritime terrorism.  
The next issue for discussion is whether other international terrorism 
conventions may be applicable to maritime terrorism. There is a view that 
among the international terrorism conventions, only the SUA Convention is 
applicable in the case of maritime terrorism.125 Some other terrorism-related 
conventions may also be relevant. Among these conventions, the International 
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (Terrorism 
Financing Convention)126 and the Hostages Convention may be relevant in 
certain circumstances.  
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generally Murray Colin Alder The Inherent Right of Self-Defence in International Law 
(Springer, Dordrecht, 2013). 
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The Hostages Convention makes hostage-taking an offence.127 As in the 
Achille Lauro incident, maritime terrorism may sometimes involve hostage-
taking. If so, this convention will be applicable, including to those responsible 
for on-shore activities supporting hostage-taking at sea.128 The applicability of 
the Hostages Convention is not limited to a particular maritime zone or to land 
generally. However, it is not applicable “where the offence is committed 
within a single State, the hostage and the alleged offender are nationals of that 
State and the alleged offender is found in the territory of that State.”129 Article 
5 of the Hostages Convention imposes an obligation on States to establish 
jurisdiction over the offence if it is committed in its territory or on board a ship 
or aircraft registered in that State, by any of its nationals, in order to compel 
that State to do or abstain from doing any act with respect to a hostage who is a 
national of that State if that State considers it appropriate.130 Moreover, parties 
to the Hostages Convention are also obliged to either extradite or prosecute an 
offender if he or she is found in its territory.131  
The Terrorism Financing Convention is also relevant and applicable in the 
case of maritime terrorism in certain circumstances. The Convention makes it 
an offence if a person “by any means, directly or indirectly, unlawfully and 
wilfully, provides or collects funds with the intention that they should be used 
or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in full or in part” to carry out an 
offence under nine international terrorism conventions or a violent act “to 
intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international 
organisation to do or to abstain from doing any act.”132 One of these nine 
conventions is the SUA Convention.133 Inclusion of the SUA Convention in its 
annex makes the Convention very relevant to maritime terrorism. If a person 
provides or collects funds for facilitating an offence under the SUA 
Convention, he or she may be prosecuted under the Terrorism Financing 
Convention. Like other terrorism conventions, the Terrorism Financing 
Convention also imposes an obligation on a State to establish jurisdiction if the 
offence is committed in its territory or on board a vessel flying its flag, or if it 
is committed by one of its nationals.134 It also allows for the establishment of 
optional jurisdiction by different stakeholder States.135  
Finally, in response to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the 
United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1373, in which it 
determined international terrorism as a threat to international peace and 
security. In this resolution, the Security Council imposed a number of general 
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and abstract obligations binding all members of the United Nations, including 
inter alia the prevention and suppression of terrorism, suppression of terrorist 
financing, enhancing international cooperation, and denying safe haven to 
terrorists and associates.136 This resolution has been described as the start of 
international legislation by the Security Council.137 It created a universal 
obligation for all United Nations members.138 This resolution has relevance in 
the case of maritime terrorism139 and may be the major determining factor in 
assessing the responsibility of the flag, coastal, and other States in respect to 
maritime terrorism incidents.  
5. Conclusion 
This article argued that the international law of piracy (more particularly, the 
piracy-related provisions of UNCLOS) is not applicable in the enforcement 
and prosecution of maritime terrorists on the high seas. This does not 
necessarily mean that UNCLOS is not relevant to maritime terrorism. Rather, 
UNCLOS may be applicable in many other aspects of maritime terrorism, 
such as in the determination of state responsibility for maritime terrorism. 
These border aspects of UNCLOS have not been discussed in this article. The 
SUA Convention and the post-September 11 developments relating to 
international laws on terrorism have created a workable international legal 
framework for combating maritime terrorism. The SUA Convention has 
introduced a very restricted form of enforcement jurisdiction on the high seas. 
Considering the political sensitivity of terrorism, this restricted enforcement 
jurisdiction is not surprising. The international law of maritime terrorism does 
not necessarily block other avenues for enforcement under general 
international law. For example, States have a right to self-defence when there 
is an actual or imminent terrorist attack. Therefore, the non-applicability of the 
international law of piracy does not make the international legal regime for 
combating maritime terrorism grossly ineffective. 
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